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How do you know that your cloud operator does not cheat?
Zitatschlüssel Schneider2012a
Autor Jörg Schneider
Buchtitel Workshop on Service Science and Engineering
Jahr 2012
Ort Shanghai, CN
Verlag Springer
Wie herausgegeben accepted
Zusammenfassung The security of a system is usually based on the physical security of the hardware. In a Cloud setup, this basic assumption cannot be assured as the system runs as a virtual machine (VM) on the operator’s hardware. The operator has access to all files, has access to the main memory, can interfere with the communication, and can manipulate the control flow. The Cloud operator can even hide manipulations by creating a virtual view for the user. In the talk, I will show how the security goals confidentiality, integrity, and availability can be violated by the Cloud provider. The user may not be able to prevent such manipulations, but can sign a service level agreement (SLA) and negotiate fines to be paid. For the Cloud operator, the manipulations are no longer lucrative if the risk to be discovered and the fine is high enough. However, a mechanism is needed to detect an attack reliably to enforce the SLA. I will present such detection mechanisms for various attack types and analyze how a bogus Cloud operator may still avoid the detection.
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Jörg Schneider
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